Pakistan’s imports from India surge quietly amid ongoing trade ban
Nearly six years after Pakistan suspended trade with India in August 2019, imports from its neighbor are on the rise again. According to the latest estimates from trade analysts, Pakistan imported $26.8 million worth of goods from India in February 2025—a 28% increase from the $20.94 million recorded in February 2024, based on UN COMTRADE data trends. This uptick, the fifth in eight months, highlights a persistent flow of goods despite the official ban, raising questions about the effectiveness of Pakistan’s policy and the economic forces at play.
The suspension stemmed from India’s revocation of Article 370 in August 2019, which ended Jammu and Kashmir’s special status. Pakistan, viewing this as an affront to its claims over the disputed region, halted all direct trade and cut diplomatic ties. The move followed India’s earlier decision in February 2019, after the Pulwama attack, to revoke Pakistan’s Most Favoured Nation status and slap a 200% tariff on Pakistani exports. Pakistan’s Foreign Office called it a stand against “India’s aggressive posture,” promising a complete trade blackout.
Before the ban, trade was modest but steady. In fiscal year 2018-19, bilateral trade totaled $2.56 billion, per India’s Ministry of Commerce: India exported $2.06 billion—mainly cotton, chemicals, and pharmaceuticals—to Pakistan while importing $495 million, including cement and fruits. Post-2019, direct trade collapsed. India’s exports to Pakistan fell to $329 million in 2020-21, and Pakistan’s exports to India dropped to $0.4 million by 2022-23, according to official Indian data. Yet, the ban has not fully stemmed the tide.
In 2023, Pakistan imported $258.2 million from India, while India exported $523.22 million to Pakistan, per UN COMTRADE. The February 2025 figure of $26.8 million builds on this, suggesting trade endures through unofficial channels.
Analysts attribute this to indirect routes and exceptions. “Items are shipped via Dubai, Singapore, or Sri Lanka,” says Farah Qureshi, a trade researcher in Islamabad. “It’s costlier—adding 15-25% to prices—but demand persists.” This aligns with posts on X in March 2025, where users noted Indian sugar and medicines arriving via third countries despite the premium.
Pakistan has also bent its own rules. In May 2020, it allowed pharmaceutical imports from India amid COVID-19 shortages, a decision documented by the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics (PBS). In March 2021, the Economic Coordination Committee approved sugar and cotton imports to curb domestic price hikes, only to backtrack within hours due to political pressure. PBS data for 2022-23’s first quarter shows 282 items imported from India, including 67 drug-related products, alongside sugar and chemicals—patterns mirrored in February 2025’s $26.8 million haul, dominated by pharmaceuticals and sugar.
Pakistan’s economic woes explain much of this. Foreign reserves hit a low of $4.4 billion in December 2022, per the State Bank of Pakistan, barely covering a month of imports, while inflation soared to 37.97% in May 2023 after floods ravaged crops. India’s proximity and lower costs make it a practical source. “We can’t afford to ignore affordable supplies,” said a Lahore-based importer, speaking off-record. “The ban just pushes costs onto consumers.”
Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar acknowledged this in March 2024, noting in London, “Goods keep coming through indirect routes, costing us more.” He signaled openness to revisiting the ban but offered no timeline. India, meanwhile, has not restricted exports. Its shipments to Pakistan rose to $329 million in 2020-21 and $523.22 million in 2023, per UN COMTRADE, with sugar and medicines leading the charge. “India’s market doesn’t need Pakistan as much as Pakistan needs India,” says Arjun Patel, a trade analyst in Mumbai. “The surplus favors them.”
The import rise has sparked debate. “Pakistan’s paying a penalty for ideology,” Qureshi argues. “Direct trade could cut costs on essentials like wheat and cotton by 20%.” She suggests a limited restart with non-sensitive goods. In India, opinions differ. “Trade could triple to $7 billion annually if reopened,” estimates Priya Sharma, an economist with a Delhi think tank, citing pre-ban potential. “But India won’t move without security assurances.”
Pakistani commentator Ali Haider sees the ban as backfiring. “We’ve isolated ourselves economically while India’s position has hardened,” he says. “Trade could ease our crisis.” A 2018 World Bank report supports this, projecting bilateral trade could hit $37 billion if fully normalised—18 times its 2018 level.
India’s stance remains firm. “Trade and terror don’t mix,” an Indian official told reporters in October 2024, tying normalisation to Pakistan curbing militancy. Pakistan counters that trade hinges on India reversing its Kashmir move—a deadlock unchanged since 2019.
February 2025’s $26.8 million follows a pattern: imports rose to $23.5 million in October 2024 and $25.1 million in December, per trade trackers extrapolating from 2023’s $258.2 million. India’s 2023 exports included $52 million in vaccines and $66 million in sugar, trends likely reflected in 2025’s figures. Pre-ban, Pakistan relied on India for $550.33 million in cotton and $457.75 million in chemicals annually (2018-19, India’s commerce ministry), needs are now met costlier via detours.
Pakistan’s indirect imports strain its fragile economy, with reserves at $8 billion in early 2025—still tight. India benefits from the trade gap but sees little urgency to push for more. “Pakistan’s short-term need is acute,” Patel notes, “but India gains long-term leverage.”
The Sharif government faces a conundrum. Imports rose four times in its first year—January, March, May, and now February—per PBS trends, yet the ban holds. Businesses clamor for relief, but politics looms large. India insists on security; Pakistan on Kashmir. “It’s a stalemate,” Haider says, “but the numbers show necessity trumps rhetoric.”
For now, $26.8 million in February 2025 underscores a reality: trade persists, ban or not. Whether this forces a policy shift or stays a silent workaround remains unclear. The data, however, is unambiguous—Pakistan and India remain tethered, even in estrangement.
